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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
FAROUK MEHIO, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant , : 
vs. : Case No. 920342 
JOHN GRABER, UTAH HIGHWAY : 
PATROL, and the STATE OF 
UTAH, : Category 16 
Defendants/Appellees. : 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The instant action comes within the original jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court of Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) 
(Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF TEE ISSUES 
1. The State of Utah, the Utah Highway Patrol, and Officer 
John Graber as an officer of the State of Utah in his official 
capacity, are not persons under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW? This matter was decided below upon a 
motion to dismiss, and the material facts are not in dispute. 
Because this issue raises only questions of law, the Court should 
give the trial court's ruling no deference and review it under a 
correctness standard. City of Logan v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 796 
P.2d 697 (Utah 1990). 
2. Given the plaintiff's failure to marshal the evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings of fact, this Court should 
assume that the record supports the findings of the trial court. 
STANDARD OP REVIEW: A trial court's findings of fact are 
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. A finding of fact is 
only clearly erroneous if Mit is against the clear weight of the 
evidence." Doelle v. Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989). 
3. Defendant John Graber's actions in using force to prevent 
plaintiff's efforts to resist arrest were objectively reasonable 
and did not violate plaintiff's constitutional rights. 
STANDARD OP REVIEW: A trial court's findings of fact are 
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. A finding of fact is 
only clearly erroneous if "it is against the clear weight of the 
evidence.11 Doelle v. Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989). 
4. John Graber is entitled to qualified immunity in that his 
actions did not violate any clearly established constitutional 
rights of the plaintiff. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Because this issue raises only questions 
of law, the Court should give the trial court's ruling no deference 
and review it under a correctness standard. City of Loaan v. Utah 
Power & Light Co.. 796 P.2d 697 (Utah 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Defendants do not believe that there are any determinative 
statutes. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought the instant action against the State of 
Utah, the Utah Highway Patrol, and Trooper John Graber claiming 
that Trooper Graber had assaulted the plaintiff while arresting 
him. R. 2-4. Pursuant to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (R. 
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22-23), plaintiff amended his complaint to state a cause of action 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. R. 48-50, 75-80. Defendants moved to 
dismiss the amended complaint on the basis of res judicata. R. 
124-188. This motion was based upon the plaintiff's conviction for 
resisting a lawful arrest by the use of unlawful force or violence 
stemming from the same incident. Said motion was denied. R. 222. 
This action then proceeded to a six day bench trial before the 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup. R. 649-655. At the close of the trial, 
Judge Rigtrup ruled dismissed this action on the merits. R. 678-
701. Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on May 22, 1992, before 
the trial court's written order was filed. R. 662. Plaintiff then 
filed a motion for a new trial or stay. R. 704. Because of 
plaintiff's first notice of appeal, the trial court's clerk 
prepared the record prematurely. While all documents filed after 
the notice of appeal are in the record, they are not numbered and 
are not shown on the index. 
The trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and its 
Judgment were entered on July 13, 1992. The trial court denied the 
plaintiff's motion for a new trial or for a stay on July 15, 1992. 
Plaintiff filed the instant appeal on July 16, 1992. Plaintiff's 
first appeal was dismissed pursuant to plaintiff's own motion. 
Mehio v. Graber, Case No. 920257 (Utah Supreme Court, September 11, 
1992) . 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The instant appeal was taken from the judgment of no cause of 
action entered in behalf of the defendants by the trial court after 
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a bench trial. No transcript of the evidence presented to the 
trial court has been filed. Indeed, no transcript has been ordered 
by the plaintiff in this matter. For this reason, the defendants-
appellees submit the following findings of facts as entered by the 
trial court on July 13, 1992 as their statement of relevant facts. 
A copy of the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
1. That on October 5, 1986, plaintiff assaulted his ex-
girlfriend Carole Jensen and her friend Vern Bliss by deliberately 
engaging in unlawful and dangerous acts directed against them with 
his car while traveling on Interstate 15. 
2. That Vern Bliss called the Utah Highway Patrol to file a 
complaint for assault and reckless driving against plaintiff 
arising out of the events which occurred on the Interstate. 
3. That Trooper John Graber received a call from Vern Bliss 
and filled out a report naming plaintiff, Farouk Mehio, as the 
perpetrator. 
4. That Trooper John Graber later called Carole Jensen at 
home to obtain further information for his report. 
5. That upon talking with Carole Jensen, Trooper Graber was 
reasonably concerned from the statements and demeanor of Ms. Jensen 
that plaintiff would attempt to harm Carole Jensen that afternoon. 
6. That Trooper Graber decided to finish filling out his 
report in person at the residence of Carole Jensen, arriving in the 
late afternoon. 
7. That while Trooper Graber was interviewing Carole Jensen, 
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Trooper Graber learned that plaintiff was prone to erratic, violent 
behavior, and that he claimed to be a Black Belt in Karate. 
8. That while Trooper Graber was at the residence, plaintiff 
arrived and began knocking loudly at the front door of the 
residence. 
9. That when the front door was opened, the plaintiff burst 
into the apartment in a boisterous upset manner and approached 
Carole Jensen. 
10. That Trooper Graber reasonably perceived an immediate 
threat to his own safety and to the safety of Carole Jensen. 
11. That Trooper Graber had probable cause to arrest 
plaintiff for aggravated assault and reckless driving. 
12. That Trooper Graber, dressed in his Utah Highway Patrol 
uniform, interposed himself between plaintiff Farouk Mehio and 
Carole Jensen and placed Mehio under arrest. 
13. That Trooper Graber put plaintiff Farouk Mehio against 
the wall of the apartment in an attempt to take him into custody 
and frisk him to prevent injury to Carole Jensen or to himself. 
14. That plaintiff pulled away from Trooper Graber and 
committed the separate crime of resisting arrest by attempting to 
leave the scene through the front door of the apartment. 
15. That Trooper Graber followed plaintiff Farouk Mehio out 
into the hallway, ordering him to stop and to not resist arrest. 
16. That Trooper Graber put plaintiff against the wall 
opposite Carole Jensen's apartment# holding him there while trying 
to handcuff and subdue him. 
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17. That plaintiff again resisted arrest, broke free and 
attempted to leave the scene. 
18. That Trooper Graber finally forced plaintiff to the 
ground, cuffed his hands behind his back and kept him there until 
backup officer Don Christensen arrived. 
19. That in the course of the struggle, plaintiff received 
some minor abrasions on his forehead, shoulder and knee and had 
force exerted upon him to take him into custody and prevent him 
from resisting arrest. 
20. That Trooper Graber used standard techniques in 
attempting to subdue this suspect. 
21. That Trooper Graber acted in an appropriate and 
reasonable manner and used reasonable force in subduing plaintiff. 
The plaintiff, Farouk Mehio, had been charged criminally 
with resisting a lawful arrest by the use of unlawful force or 
violence stemming from this same incident. R. 142. He was 
convicted of this crime in the Third Circuit Court. R. 140. On 
appeal, Mehio's conviction was affirmed. R. 144-146. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State of Utah and the Utah Highway Patrol are not 
"persons" as that term is used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and cannot 
therefore, be sued under that statute for any reason. The 
individual defendant, Trooper John Graber, in his official 
capacity, cannot be sued for damages in a civil rights action 
because he is not a 'person' as that term is used. A state 
officer, in his official capacity, can only be sued for prospective 
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relief. 
While the plaintiff challenges that factual findings of the 
trial court, he does not marshal the evidence in support of the 
findings. Because the plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of 
marshaling the evidence, the court should assume that the record 
supports the factual findings of the trial court. 
Plaintiff resisted a lawful arrest attempt by means of 
unlawful force or violence. Officer John Graber's use of force to 
overcome plaintiff's attempts to resist arrest were objectively 
reasonable and did not violate the plaintiff's constitutional 
rights. Graber's actions did not violate any clearly established 
constitutional right of the plaintiff and Graber is therefore 
entitled to qualified immunity. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE OF UTAH, THE UTAH HIGHWAY 
PATROL, AND OFFICER JOHN GRABER IN HIS 
'OFFICIAL CAPACITY' ARE NOT 'PERSONS' PURSUANT 
TO 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 SUCH AS CAN BE SUED IN 
STATE COURT 
Plaintiff alleges violations of his federal civil rights and 
seeks recovery pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is clearly 
established law that neither the State of Utah, the Utah Highway 
Patrol, or their officers in their "official capacities" are 
"persons" pursuant to §1983 and cannot therefore be sued 
thereunder. 
In a recent decision, the United States Supreme Court made it 
abundantly clear that the several states cannot be sued under §1983 
in state courts. In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police. 109 
7 
S.Ct. 2304 (1989), the Court held that the State of Michigan and 
its department of state police could not be sued in Michigan State 
Court for civil rights violations. 
Our conclusion is further supported by our 
holdings that in enacting § 1983, Congress did 
not intend to override well-established 
immunities or defenses under the common law. 
"One important assumption underlying the 
court's decisions in this area is that members 
of the 42nd Congress were familiar with 
common-law principles, including defenses 
previously recognized in ordinary tort 
litigation, and that they likely intended 
these common-law principles to obtain, absent 
specific provisions to the contrary.11 
(Citations omitted). The doctrine of 
sovereign immunity was a familiar doctrine at 
common law. "The principle is elementary that 
a State cannot be sued in its own courts 
without its consent," It is an "established 
principle of jurisprudence" that the sovereign 
cannot be sued in its own courts without its 
consent. We cannot conclude that §1983 was 
intended to disregard the well-established 
immunity of a State from being sued without 
its consent. 
109 S.Ct. at 2309-2310, citations omitted. The State of Utah has 
expressly declared that it does not waive its immunity as to civil 
rights claims. §63-30-10 (1) (b) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. 
Therefore, the State of Utah and the Utah Highway Patrol were 
properly dismissed from this federal civil rights action. 
The United States Supreme Court has continuously held that the 
states are not subject to actions, regardless of the nature of the 
relief sought. Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon. 473 U.S. 234, 
105 S.Ct. 3142, reh. den. 106 S.Ct. 18 (1985); Pennhurst State 
School and Hospital v. Halderman. 465 U.S. 89, (1984); Florida 
Department of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Association. 450 U.S. 
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147 (1981); Alabama v. Puorh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978); and Missouri v. 
Fiske, 290 U.S. 18 (1933). Indeed, Kentucky v. Graham. 473 U.S. 
159 (1985) expressly held that the State of Kentucky could not be 
brought into a damages action against one of its employees for the 
sole purpose of an award of attorneys fees. 
The Court in Will also addressed the question of whether or 
not official capacity actions for damages could be maintained 
against state officials in state court pursuant to § 1983. 
Obviously, state officials literally are 
persons. But a suit against a state official 
in his or her official capacity is not a suit 
against the official but rather is a suit 
against the official's office. As such, it is 
no different from a suit against the State 
itself. We see no reason to adopt a different 
rule in the present context, particularly when 
such a rule would allow petitioner to 
circumvent congressional intent by a mere 
pleading device. We hold that neither a State 
nor its officials acting in their official 
capacities are "persons" under §1983. 
109 S.Ct. at 2311-2312, citations and footnote omitted. For this 
reason, the instant action, as far as it sought to hold Trooper 
John Graber liable for damages in his official capacity, was 
properly dismissed as well. 
II. BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO 
MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT, THIS COURT SHOULD 
ASSUME THAT THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS 
In considering Mr. Mehio's arguments on the evidence, the 
appellate court should begin its analysis with the trial court's 
findings of fact and not with Mr. Mehio's assertions as to what the 
evidence was or should have been. Reed v. Reed. 806 P.2d 1182, 
1184 (Utah 1991) (footnote omitted). 
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The district court's findings of fact are 
based upon a judgment of the credibility of 
the witnesses. It is the province of the 
trier of fact to assess the credibility of 
witnesses, and we will not second-guess the 
trial court where there is a reasonable basis 
to support its findings. In order to 
challenge the court's findings of fact, the 
defendant must marshal all of the evidence in 
favor of the findings and then demonstrate 
that even when reviewing the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the court below, the 
evidence is insufficient to support the 
findings. 
Mr. Mehio has failed to meet this burden. Far from 
marshalling the evidence and showing that the trial court's 
findings of fact (set out fully in the statement of relevant facts, 
supra) are not supported by the evidence, plaintiff has failed to 
even provide the court with the evidence. No transcript of the six 
day bench trial has been ordered by the plaintiff. R. 702. 
Plaintiff's brief does not seek to set forth how Judge Rigtrup's 
findings of fact are incorrect, but is instead a verbatim 
repetition of the plaintiff's pre-trial brief (R. 610-616) with no 
reference to the evidence that was adduced at trial. 
An appellate court does not lightly disturb 
the verdict of a jury nor the findings of fact 
made by a trial court. If a challenge is made 
to the findings, an appellant must marshal all 
evidence in favor of the facts as found by the 
trial court and then demonstrate that even 
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the court below, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the findings of fact. 
If appellant fails to marshal the evidence, 
the appellate court assumes that the record 
supports the findings of the trial court and 
proceeds to review the accuracy of the lower 
court's conclusions of law and the application 
of that law in the case. 
Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991) . Because the 
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plaintiff has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings of fact, the defendants ask that this Court 
assume said findings are supported by the record and affirm the 
correctness of the trial court's factual findings. 
III. DEFENDANT JOHN GRABER'S ACTIONS WERE 
OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE AND DID NOT VIOLATE ANY 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OP THE PLAINTIFF 
In Graham v. Connor. 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989), the United States 
Supreme Court determined what constitutional standard governs a 
free citizen's claim that law enforcement officials used excessive 
force in making an arrest. Graham involved a civil rights action 
by a diabetic who alleged that he had been injured by the excessive 
use of force by officers. 
Today we make explicit what was implicit in 
Garner's analysis, and hold that all claims 
that law enforcement officers have used 
excessive force - deadly or not - in the 
course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or 
other "seizure" of a free citizen should be 
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 
"reasonableness" standard, rather than under a 
"substantive due process" approach. 
109 S.Ct. at 1871 (emphasis in original). In explaining the 
"reasonableness" standard, the Court said: 
The "reasonableness" of a particular use of 
force must be judged from the perspective of a 
reasonable officer on the scene, rather than 
with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. . . . 
The calculus of reasonableness must embody 
allowance for the fact that police officers 
are often forced to make split-second 
judgments - in circumstances that are tense, 
uncertain, and rapidly evolving - about the 
amount of force that is necessary in a 
particular situation. 
As in other Fourth Amendment contexts, 
however, the "reasonableness" inquiry in an 
excessive force case is an objective one: the 
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question is whether the officers' actions are 
"objectively reasonable" in light of the facts 
and circumstances confronting them, without 
regard to their underlying intent or 
motivation. 
109 S.Ct. at 1872 (citations omitted). A short review of the 
applicable findings of fact made by the trial judge demonstrates 
the objective reasonableness of Trooper Graber's conduct in the 
instant action. Mehio had assaulted Carole Jensen and Vern Bliss 
by his reckless driving earlier that day. While the officer was 
interviewing Ms. Jensen, Farouk Mehio began knocking loudly at the 
front door of Jensen's apartment. When the front door was opened, 
Mehio burst into Jensen's apartment in a boisterous and upset 
manner, and approached Carole Jensen. 
Officer John Graber's use of force in arresting Mehio was not 
objectively unreasonable. Trooper Graber used standard techniques 
in his effort to subdue Mehio. The amount of force that Officer 
Graber had to use was increased by Mehio's efforts to resist 
arrest. Mehio had been previously convicted of resisting a lawful 
arrest by the use of unlawful force or violence. Defendants submit 
that Judge Rigtrup's determination that defendant Graber's conduct 
was objectively reasonable is supported by the record and should be 
affirmed on appeal. The transcript of Judge Rigtrup's oral 
findings makes it clear that the trial court applied the correct 
standard of objective reasonableness to the factual questions 
before him. R. 678-701. 
A trial court's finding of fact will not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous. This Court has stated that a finding is not 
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clearly erroneous unless "it is against the great weight of 
evidence or if the court is otherwise definitely and firmly 
convinced that a mistake has been made." Bountiful v. Riley. 784 
P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989). That is not the case here. The 
weight of the evidence supports the finding that Officer Graber's 
conduct was objectively reasonable. 
IV. DEFENDANT JOHN GRABER IS ENTITLED TO 
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY UNDER THE STANDARD SET 
FORTH IN HARLOW V. FITZGERALD. 
During the past decade, the United States Supreme Court has 
emphasized the important role played by qualified immunity in 
disposing of civil rights claims against state and federal 
officials before trial. Recognizing that litigation against state 
officials under §1983 poses a significant risk of deterring public 
officers from the proper discharge of their official duties, the 
Supreme Court has provided qualified immunity to state officials. 
Thus# "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known," governmental officials are 
shielded from liability for civil actions for damages. Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Davis v. Scherer. 468 U.S. 
183, 191 (1984). The Supreme Court has described the justification 
for the qualified immunity defense as follows: 
Where an official could be expected to know 
that certain conduct would violate statutory 
or constitutional rights, he should be made to 
hesitate: and a person who suffers injury 
caused by such conduct may have a cause of 
action. But where an official's duties 
legitimately require action in which clearly 
established rights are not implicated, the 
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public interest may be better served by action 
taken "with independence and without fear of 
consequences." 
457 U.S. at 819, citations omitted. The test set forth in Harlow 
has come to be known as a test of "objective legal reasonableness." 
See also, Anderson v. Creicrhton. 483 U.S. 635 (1987). 
In Anderson, the United States Supreme Court rejected an 
attempt at defining broadly what rights have been "clearly 
established". The Court held that the mere existence of a clearly 
established broad and general right would not be sufficient to hold 
an officer liable. Explaining the clearly established law test of 
qualified immunity, the Court explained: 
The operation of this standard, however, 
depends substantially upon the level of 
generality at which the relevant "legal rule" 
is to be identified. For example, the right 
to due process of law is quite clearly 
established by the Due Process Clause, and 
thus there is a sense in which any action that 
violates that Clause (no matter how unclear it 
may be that the particular action is a 
violation) violates a clearly established 
right. Much the same could be said of any 
other constitutional or statutory violation. 
But if the test of "clearly established law" 
were to be applied at this level of 
generality, it would bear no relationship to 
the "objective legal reasonableness" that is 
the touchstone of Harlow. Plaintiffs would be 
able to convert the rule of qualified immunity 
that our cases plainly establish into a rule 
of virtually unqualified liability simply by 
alleging violation of extremely abstract 
rights. Harlow would be transformed from a 
guarantee of immunity into a rule of pleading. 
Such an approach, in sum, would destroy "the 
balance that our cases strike between the 
interests in vindication of citizens' 
constitutional rights and in public officials' 
effective performance of their duties," by 
making it impossible for officials "reasonably 
[to] anticipate when their conduct may give 
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rise to liability for damages." Davis. supra 
at 195. [footnote omitted.] It should not be 
surprising, therefore, that our cases 
establish that the right the official is 
alleged to have violated must have been 
"clearly established" in a more 
particularized, and hence more relevant, 
sense: The contours of the right must be 
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official 
would understand that what he is doing 
violates that right. This is not to say that 
an official action is protected by qualified 
immunity unless the very action in question 
has previously been held unlawful, see 
Mitchell, supra. at 535, n. 12; but it is to 
say that in the light of pre-existing law the 
unlawfulness must be apparent. 
Id. . at 639-640, emphasis added. Anderson makes clear that the 
objective reasonableness of an official's conduct does not turn on 
whether the conduct subsequently is found to be constitutionally 
suspect. That case involved a §1983 suit against a law enforcement 
officer who had conducted a warrantless search under the mistaken 
belief that probable cause existed. The Court held that the 
officer was entitled to qualified immunity because his belief in 
the lawfulness of his conduct had been reasonable. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Hilliard v. City and 
County of Denver. 930 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1991) stated that it is 
the plaintiff who must show that the constitutional law he claims 
has been violated was clearly established. 
It is the plaintiff's burden to convince the 
court that the law was clearly established. 
In doing so, the plaintiff cannot simply 
identify a clearly established right in the 
abstract and allege that the defendant has 
violated it. Instead, the plaintiff "must 
demonstrate a substantial correspondence 
between the conduct in question and prior law 
allegedly establishing that the defendant's 
actions were clearly prohibited." While the 
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plaintiff need not show that the specific 
action at issue has previously been held 
unlawful, the alleged unlawfulness must be 
"apparent" in light of preexisting law. The 
"contours of the right must be sufficiently 
clear that a reasonable official would 
understand that what he is doing violates that 
right." If the plaintiff is unable to 
demonstrate that the law allegedly violated 
was clearly established, the plaintiff is not 
allowed to proceed with the suit. 
930 F.2d at 1518, citations omitted. In the instant action, 
the plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of establishing that 
Defendant Graber violated any clearly established constitutional 
right of the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff has not cited any authority that would show that the 
limited use of force in overcoming plaintiff's efforts to resist 
arrest violated any established constitutional right. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly dismissed this action. The State of 
Utah, and the Utah Highway Patrol, cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. The individual state officer cannot be sued for damages in 
his official capacity. 
Plaintiff's failure to marshal the evidence requires this 
Court to assume the correctness of the findings of fact of the 
trial court. Those findings of fact clearly support the finding 
that Officer Graber's conduct met the objectively reasonable test. 
Officer Graber did not violate the rights of Farouk Mehio. Even if 
there was a question, Officer Graber would be entitled to qualified 
immunity in this matter. 
For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court should be 
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affirmed, * 
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